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Birth Pangs: Greenland’s Struggle For
Independence
MINA SAID*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of international law, states reign. Consequently, the
possible birth of a new state or the division of an existing one is a
cataclysmic event that, for international law, is akin to the birth or death
of a star in the cosmos. Both engender consequences, both in space and
time, far broader than the creation or division of the entity itself. The
importance of the subject necessitates, therefore, clarity to temper the
chaos, instability, and uncertainty inherent in international relations.
Yet, despite this immediate need, uncertainty continues to permeate the
rules governing the creation of new states. This uncertainty is
exacerbated by the fact that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
judicial arm of the United Nations, declines to provide an authoritative
answer even when called upon to do so.1 But now, the question lingers
before the eye of the law once again. Greenland’s current struggle for
independence from the Kingdom of Denmark brings the concepts of
statehood, sovereignty, self-determination, and secession forward. The
international legal community should therefore seize this opportunity to
crystallize the jurisprudence controlling unilateral secession, selfdetermination, and the creation of states. This discussion takes a step
towards that goal.
The journey begins with Greenland’s emergence as a Danish
colony and its subsequent decolonization and integration within the
Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland’s colonial era began, for all intents

* J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Riverside.
The author thanks Professor Cesare Romano for inspiring the subject of this article and the
editors and staff of Loyola Law School’s International & Comparative Law Review for their
invaluable input.
1. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory
Opinion re: Kosovar Independence].
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and purposes, in 1721 in an attempt to root out paganism and introduce
Lutheran Christianity.2 Since then, Danish control over the Greenlandic
territory and its people took a variety of forms. 3 Beginning in 1970,
however, the “road to home rule” began as Denmark steadily conceded
power to Greenlandic authorities over a number of decades.4 This has
culminated into the Act on Greenland Self-Government, which came
into force on June 21, 2009.5 Specific provisions of the Act are
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this discussion. For
now, it suffices to note that immediately beginning with the preamble,
the Act invokes international law. From the outset, the preamble
recognizes the people of Greenland as “a people pursuant to
international law with the right of self-determination.”6 The Act also
declares Greenlandic to be the official language in Greenland.7 The
purpose of the Act, according to Greenland’s Statsministeriet, “has been
to facilitate the transfer of additional authority and thus responsibility to
Greenlandic authorities . . . .”8
The most significant part of the Act, entitled “Greenland’s Access
to Independence,” emerges from these specific provisions. 9 Although
this section expresses Denmark’s current willingness to release its hold
upon Greenland, the agreement has no value in terms of international
law. Regardless of how hopeful the prospects may seem for Greenland,
the Act remains merely an agreement between a sovereign state and its
constituent—essentially, a domestic agreement. The Act confers no
internationally enforceable obligation on Denmark to grant
independence to Greenland; therefore, the principal mission lies in
determining what, if any, rights the people of Greenland have under
international law to exercise self-determination through a unilateral
declaration of independence from Denmark.
This note stands for the proposition that under public international
law, Greenland remains without an absolute right to exercise selfdetermination through a unilateral declaration of independence from
Denmark for three reasons. First, a state’s right to unilaterally declare
independence has, in the past, arisen only after the international
community acknowledged the presence of both (1) a deprivation of the
right to internal self-determination, and (2) systematic violations of

2. AXEL KJAER SØRENSEN, DENMARK-GREENLAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11
(2006).
3. See generally id. at 11-141.
4. Id. at 142.
5. Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act no. 473 of June 12, 2009 (Den.), available at
http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/GR_Self-Government_UK.doc [hereinafter Self-Government Act
no. 473].
6. Id. at Preamble.
7. Id. ¶ 20; “Statsministeriet” is the Danish word for Prime Minister’s Office.
8. The
Greenland
Self-Government
Arrangement,
STATSMINISTERIET,
http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html (last visited July 10, 2014).
9. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5, ¶ 21.
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human rights. Second, Denmark has neither deprived Greenland’s
indigenous population of its right to internal self-determination, and nor
has it committed any systematic violations of human rights. Lastly,
these requirements are necessary to preserve international law’s
preoccupation with stability and predictability.
Accordingly, the discussion below will proceed in the following
manner: the first section discusses the Greenlandic population’s status
as “a people” pursuant to international law, Greenland’s colonial
relationship under Denmark, and Greenland’s steady accumulation of
autonomy up to its current self-government status; the second section
explores the legal issues that would surround a unilateral declaration of
independence by Greenland and discusses significant incidents in
history where similar legal concepts applied; the third section applies
the relevant legal concepts, in conjunction with their application to
previous independence movements, to Greenland’s current predicament
in order to ascertain whether or not international law would recognize a
right in Greenland to unilaterally declare independence and explores,
from a policy perspective, the justifications proffered in favor of
Greenlandic independence and will conclude with a refutation thereof;
lastly, the article concludes with a discussion surveying other legal
problems that might arise were Greenland to achieve independence
through an agreement with Denmark.
II. THE PEOPLE OF GREENLAND
Any discussion about self-determination, secession, or
independence must begin by identifying its principal object, its main
beneficiary, and its main character—a people. The reason for this lies in
the fact that the right to self-determination, which will be discussed at
length below, does not belong to states, international organizations, or
governments; it belongs to the people.10 The definition of a people is
relatively specific. A people, under international law, is
[A] group of persons living in a given country or locality,
having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own
and united by this identity of race, religion, language and
traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to
preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship,
ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and
rendering mutual assistance to each other.11
In other words, “a people” is a group of persons united by a
common nationality or ethnicity, religion, and language who value the

10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI) (Dec.16, 1966).
11. Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2000).
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preservation of that which unifies them.12
There is little doubt that Greenland’s population bears the marks of
a people. The present-day indigenous Inuit population traces its
presence in Greenland as far back as 4000-5000 years,13 and more
directly, to the last Eskimo migration of the Thule culture in the year
800 A.D.14 Greenland’s current population is about 89% indigenous
Inuit.15 The population has in recent times even more resolutely asserted
its identity as Inuit.16 For example, locations and streets that once bore
Danish titles in Greenland now bear Inuit names.17 “Inuit languages are
[also] being promoted, and there is renewed focus on Inuit culture and
traditions.”18 Greenlandic, a “polysynthetic language [that] belongs to
the Eskimo-Aleutic languages,” is currently Greenland’s primary
official language.19 The people of Greenland are united as well in
religious confession as Protestant Christians.20
With all this evidencing that the people of Greenland are united by
a common nationality and ethnicity, religion, and language, there is
little room to dispute their status as a people pursuant to international
law. As a people, Greenland’s population has the right to selfdetermination; the scope of this right and the extent to which a people
may exercise it to break away from an oppressive state, however, is
limited to the direst of circumstances.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Identifying a group as a people is only the first step in determining
its right to exercise external self-determination. Whether a people is
entitled to unilaterally secede from a mother state is largely a question
of fact. The answer hinges upon the extent to which the group had been
historically deprived, in a systematic way, of its right to internal selfdetermination and its right to exist as itself in all its uniqueness, richness
of culture, and cohesiveness. Understanding Greenland’s desire for
independence therefore demands an overview of Greenland’s
relationship with its parent state, Denmark.

12. Id.
13. Greenland’s
Culture
and
History,
GREENLANDHOLIDAY.COM,
http://www.greenlandexplored.com/AboutGreenland/InuitCulture (last visited July 10, 2014).
14. Facts on Greenland, GREENLAND REPRESENTATION TO THE EU, BRUSSELS,
http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/About%20Greenland/Facts%20on%20Greenland.aspx (last visited July
10, 2013).
15. The
World
Factbook:
Greenland,
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_gl.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
16. Andy Rugg, Decline of Norse a lesson for modern Greenland, COPENHAGEN POST (Dec.
3, 2011) http://cphpost.dk/news/decline-of-norse-a-lesson-for-modern-greenland.178.html.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Facts on Greenland, supra note 14.
20. Id.
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A. Greenland as a Danish Colony—The Eviction of the Thule Tribe
Fighters for Greenlandic independence cite the forced eviction of
the Thule tribe from its home as proof of Denmark’s historic dominance
over, and denial of the right of internal self-determination to, the
indigenous people of Greenland. Therefore, It is necessary to investigate
this specific incident. The story of Greenland’s colonial history began in
172121 when Danish settlers landed near present-day Nuuk.22 From that
time until the middle of the nineteenth century, the people of Greenland
governed themselves only in a limited capacity; the responsibility of
governing lay almost entirely in the hands of Denmark.23 The
Thule
tribe, an Inuit people that lived in northwest Greenland from about 2000
B.C., depended solely on hunting and fishing for their subsistence and
lived completely isolated until 1818.24 In 1909, a Danish polar
researcher established a commercial trading station in Greenland and
began to colonize the area, calling it the Thule District.25
During World War II, Denmark agreed to permit the United States
to establish military bases and meteorological stations on Greenland. In
1946, the United States built a weather station in the Thule District;
after the war in 1951, the United States and Denmark then concluded a
treaty on the defense of Greenland.26 Denmark had allowed the United
States to established an air base “amidst the applicants’ [Inuit] hunting
areas and in the vicinity of the [Inuit’s] native village site, Uummannaq
(then called Thule).”27 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
acknowledges as common knowledge that the installation of the air base
and the activities conducted thereon increasingly restricted the Thule
tribe’s access to hunting and fishing, which had “a detrimental effect on
the wildlife in the area.”28
In the spring of 1953, Denmark further permitted the United States
to establish an anti-aircraft artillery unit and expand the base to cover
the entire land of the Thule tribe.29 As a result, the Thule tribe was
evicted on May 25, 1953 albeit having “received more cash than they

21. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,
Information received from Governments Denmark and Greenland, U.N. Doc.
E/C.19/2009/4/Add.4, ¶ 2 (May 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish SelfGovernment Commission].
22. Timeline: Greenland, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1023448.stm (last
updated Jan. 10, 2012).
23. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 2.
24. Hingitaq 53 v. Denmark, App. No. 18584/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2006), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72219 (pagination refers to PDF file
accessible on the cited webpage).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3.
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had ever before seen in their lives.”30 Within a few days, the twenty-six
Inuit families “left Uummannaq, leaving behind their houses, a hospital,
a school, a radio station, warehouses, a church and a graveyard (the
family houses were later burned down and the church was moved to
another village on the west coast).”31 After taking its case to the ECHR
in 2004,32 the Thule tribe’s appeal was ultimately rejected.33
B. Greenland’s Expanding Autonomy
In contrast to the picture painted by the Thule tribe’s eviction, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, Denmark began steadily allowing
the Greenlandic population to administer local matters through elected
councils.34 Nevertheless, Greenland remained a non-self governing
territory under Chapter XI of the UN Charter.35 Thus, from 1945-1954,
Denmark was required to periodically submit reports about Greenland’s
status to the decolonization bodies of the UN.36 By 1953, “Greenland
was annexed as a Danish county,” and its colonial status was formally
abolished.37
As discussed below, Greenland’s integration with Denmark carries
a significant implication. Colonies are generally entitled to exercise
their right to external self-determination;38 if they so choose, they may
break off from the colonial power that exercised dominion over them.
The fact that the international community, through the UN General
Assembly, recognized Greenland as an integral part of Denmark,
however, disqualifies the people of Greenland from appealing to their
former colonial status as the sole basis upon which it may assert a right
to secede.
Nevertheless, at this point, a significant wrinkle enters the story.
Although Denmark held a referendum on the annexation of Greenland
for its own people, no referendum took place in Greenland.39 The
absence of the voice of the people of Greenland complicates the
defining of Greenland’s current colonial status. If it is a colony, it is
entitled to exercise its right to external self-determination through any
means it desires. If it is no longer a colony, external self-determination
30. Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Arctic in World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 1307, 1369 (2009).
31. Hingitaq 53, Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 24, at 3.
32. Stephen Frottrell, Inuit survival battle against US base, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2004),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3753677.stm.
33. Hingitaq 53, Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 24, at 20.
34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶¶
2-3.
35. Id. ¶ 4.
36. Id.
37. Naja Dyrendom Graugaard, National Identity in Greenland in the Age of SelfGovernment 13 (Ctr. for the Critical Study of Global Power and Politics, Working Paper No.
CSGP 09/5, 2008).
38. See infra § IV(B).
39. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 13.
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is available only through agreement with Denmark. This concern is
addressed below, but its ability to influence the outcome of the present
discussion necessitates bringing it forward here. It is sufficient at this
point in the story to remark that by 1954, Denmark was no longer
required to submit these reports because the UN General Assembly
recognized “Greenland’s integration into the Kingdom of Denmark.”40
Contrary to the aims of decolonization, this period of integration
was, as far as the Greenlandic population was concerned, marred by a
period of “Danization” characterized by “assimilation policy, birthplace criteria, undermining of the Greenlandic language, [and] the
growing Danish physical presence in leading positions.”41 Ironically,
this “led to a growing Greenlandic consciousness of belonging to a
distinct ethnic group” and precipitated the rise of nationalist movements
and a revival of Inuit political awareness during the 1960s and 1970s.42
Eventually, in 1973, a Home Rule Committee was set up internally
“for the purpose of considering the possibility of establishing a Home
Rule Arrangement within the framework of the unity of the Realm.”43
On May 1, 1979, the Greenland Home Rule Arrangement (Home Rule)
came into force after being adopted, first by the Danish Parliament, and
then by the people of Greenland.44 One author characterized this period
of Home Rule as a process of “Greenlandizing”45 in reaction to the
“Danization” of the 1950s up until the establishment of the Home
Rule.46 Thus, the policies of the Home Rule government focused on,
inter alia, “expanding the use of the Greenlandic language, extending
support to the Greenlandic cultural life, [and] replacing Danish workers
with Greenlanders.”47
After Home Rule had been in effect for 20 years, the Home Rule
government had assumed a great deal of legislative and executive power
and was responsible for “Greenland’s internal administration, direct and
indirect taxes, the established church, fishing in the territory, hunting,
agriculture and reindeer breeding, social welfare, labour market affairs,
education and cultural affairs, vocational education, other matters
relating to trade, health services, the housing area and protection of the
environment.”48
Because Greenland had assumed all the power it could assume
under the 1979 Home Rule Arrangement, the Greenland government
recognized “a need for revising Greenland’s position within the unity of
40. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 4.
41. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 14.
42. Id. at 14-15.
43. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 6
(emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 15-16.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
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the Realm.”49 Thereafter, the Greenlandic government set up another
Home Rule Commission, which recommended that Greenland’s
parliament set up a joint Greenland-Danish commission.50
On June 21, 2004, the Danish Prime Minister and the Greenlandic
Premier signed the terms necessary to establish the Greenland-Danish
Self-Government Commission.51 The Commission’s purpose was to
“submit draft legislation regarding a self-government arrangement for
Greenland.”52 This commission, however, did not have free reign in
accomplishing its purpose. Its agreements were to remain within
specific parameters. These parameters required the new self-government
arrangement “to be placed ‘within the framework of the existing unity
of the Realm’ and take its ‘point of departure in Greenland’s present
constitutional position,’ namely the existing Danish Constitution.”53 In
other words, whatever responsibilities the new self-government
authorities would be permitted to assume, they would not include any
assumption of power over “the Constitution, foreign affairs, defence and
security policy, the Supreme Court, nationality, and exchange rate and
monetary policy” of Denmark.54 The Danish Constitution was to remain
the supreme law of the land and its Supreme Court would supersede any
Greenlandic local courts.55 Additionally, the Danish government was to
have sole authority over Greenland’s foreign affairs, defense, and
security policy.56 It is important to make apparent, however, that even
though Denmark officially reigned over Greenland’s foreign affairs, the
Home Rule Government of Greenland actively participated in
international agreements even prior to the Act on Greenland SelfGovernment.57 Therefore, the new self-government arrangement, in
essence, would already have wide latitude in arranging Greenland’s
domestic affairs despite power remaining to the Kingdom of Denmark.

49. Id. ¶ 8.
50. Id. ¶ 9.
51. The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in
Greenland: Executive Summary, ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT, 2008, at 3,
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/getfile.php/953432.1529.dwfvyfwtyy/Report+on+SelfGovernment+in+Greenland+-+Executive+Summary.pdf.
52. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, supra note 21, ¶
15.
53. Id. ¶ 16.
54. Id. ¶ 7.
55. Id. ¶ 24.
56. Id.
57. International
legal
framework,
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/reports-to-thestorting/2011-2012/meld-st-7-20112012-2/5.html?id=697752 (“In 2006 an agreement was
concluded between Norway and Denmark together with the Home Rule Government of
Greenland on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fisheries zones in the area between
Greenland and Svalbard”) (emphasis added).
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C. The Act on Greenland Self-Government
The work of the commission ultimately culminated in The Act on
Greenland Self-Government, which came into force on June 21, 2009.58
This agreement between Greenland and Denmark contains four
provisions that are relevant here. First, it recognizes the people of
Greenland as indeed a people under international law entitled to selfdetermination.59 Second, it officially establishes Greenlandic as
Greenland’s official language.60 Third, it provides Greenland with a
greater degree of responsibility in a number of new fields such as:
“administration of justice, including the establishment of courts of law;
the prison and probation service; the police; the field relating to
company law, accounting and auditing; mineral resource activities;
aviation; law of legal capacity, family law and succession law; aliens
and border controls; the working environment; as well as financial
regulation and supervision.”61 Lastly, it offers the possibility of
Greenlandic independence subject to agreement with Denmark.62
Indeed, because the principal purpose of the Self-Government Act was
“to facilitate the transfer of additional authority and thus responsibility
to Greenlandic authorities,”63 the Self-Government Act nevertheless
represents a significant step towards full Greenlandic self-governance.
IV. LEGAL CONCEPTS: STATEHOOD, SOVEREIGNTY, SELFDETERMINATION, AND SECESSION
Greenland’s quest for independence means that it desires
statehood. This desire, however, stands directly at odds with Denmark’s
identity as a sovereign state. Intuitively speaking, if a particular state is
truly sovereign—in the literal sense of the word—over its people and its
land, then it follows that only that state can decide whether or not to
give up a portion of that over which it is sovereign.64 But, in
International Law, two conflicting yet necessary concepts exist. On the
one hand, the concept of a state and its sovereignty serves to preserve
the integrity and stability of the international community because states
are the actors in international law.65 On the other hand, human rights,

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5.
Id. at Preamble.
Id. ¶ 20.
The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, supra note 8.
Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5, ¶ 21.
The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, supra note 8.
Sovereignty literally means “supreme dominion, authority, or rule.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS: Sovereignty; see also Taiaiake
Alfred, From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse, INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS 22 (2001) (defining sovereignty as “supreme political authority, independent and
unlimited by any other power.”).
65. See U.N. Secretary-General, Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the
rule of law at the national and international levels, Summary, U.N. Doc. A/66/749 (Mar. 16,
2012) [hereinafter Delivering justice] (“[R]espect for the rule of law at the international and

SAID_FINAL_FOR_PUB

290

10/14/2014 2:21 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:281

consisting in a separate body of law entirely, presumably serve to
protect persons, peoples, and their dignity.
A. Statehood and Sovereignty
In order to better understand Greenland’s goal, it is necessary to
understand what it means to be a state and why statehood is so coveted
around the world. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States defines a state as “a person of international law
[that possesses] a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c)
government; and d) [the] capacity to enter into relations with the other
states.”66 Once a state satisfies this definition, it acquires a defining
characteristic, namely, sovereignty—the ever-coveted perk of becoming
a state. Although a precise definition of sovereignty is difficult to come
by, general consensus recognizes that it at least describes a state’s
possession of “supreme power and authority relating to a body politic
that is territorially determined or determinable.”67 The concept of
sovereignty also means that “the territorial integrity and political
independence of the State are inviolable” and that “[e]very state has an
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural
systems, without interference in any form by another State.”68
Practically speaking, this means that a sovereign state has control
over its people, its territory, its manner of government, and is an equal
participant in the international arena—equal even to those states
wielding the most “subjective” power.69 Attaining statehood is,
therefore, an alluring proposition. Within the framework of an already
existing state however, a people’s desire for independence stands
directly against the supreme and inviolable dominion of the state from
which it seeks independence. However, because self-determination is
also considered a human right, it is therefore necessary to carve out the
right balance between the interests of a people and the interests of a
sovereign state.

national levels is central to ensuring the predictability and legitimacy of international relations,
and for delivering just outcomes in the daily life of all individuals.”).
66. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, U.N.T.S. 881 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]; see also Jianming Shen, Sovereignty,
Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1101, 1126
(2000) (explaining that these requirements cannot be considered individually and in a vacuum.
Instead, “they relate to and find definition in one another [such that] a putative state must possess
a government that, itself, governs a population within a specified territory and that, itself, has the
capacity to enter into foreign relations”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 429, 436-37 (2012).
68. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda1f104.html.
69. See generally UN General Assembly, Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter Functions and Powers of the General Assembly].
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B. Self-determination
The right to self-determination, as expressed by modern
secessionist movements, appears on its face to be antithetical to the
principles of statehood and sovereignty; this therefore warrants
reconciliation of the two. Hundreds of secessionist movements are
active in various communities around the world,70 and these secessionist
movements “almost invariably claim legitimacy for their cause on the
basis of the international law principle proclaiming the right to selfdetermination of peoples.”71 The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations
defines the right of self-determination in the following way:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter.72
One of the ways in which a people may implement its right to selfdetermination is through “the establishment of a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status.” 73
However, The Declaration of Friendly Relations, after discussing the
obligations of states to preserve and promote the right of selfdetermination of its peoples, provides an important qualification to that
right:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour.74
These provisions reveal three important characteristics of selfdetermination. First, every state must respect its peoples’ right to
determine their own political, economic, and cultural development.
Second, a people may implement its right to self-determination through
independence, secession, or integration. Third, if a state complies with
its obligations to respect the right of self-determination of its peoples,

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Van Der Vyver, supra note 11, at 1.
Id.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68.
Id.
Id.
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then a people may not take any action antagonistic to the territorial
integrity or political unity of the sovereign state in which it exists.
From the juxtaposition of the second and third characteristics, it
necessarily follows that a people’s ability to implement its right to selfdetermination through secession is limited. Therefore, the question
becomes: if all peoples have an inherent right to self-determination,
what is the scope of that right? The resolution rests in recognizing two
sub-types of self-determination: (1) the right to internal selfdetermination, and (2) the right to external self-determination.75
Understanding and distinguishing these two sides of selfdetermination is key to a reasoned analysis with respect to Greenland’s
capacity to seek unilateral secession. Internal self-determination
consists of “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and
cultural development within the framework of an existing state.” 76 It is
the most common vehicle through which peoples fulfill their right to
self-determination.77
On the other hand, external self-determination consists in either
“the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status.”78 With respect to the Greenlandic people,
external self-determination would arise as a claim to the right to
unilateral secession. Theoretically, the external exercise of selfdetermination arises from the fact that a “state that gravely violates its
obligations towards a distinct people or community within its
boundaries loses the legitimacy to rule over that people.”79 Thus, the
external right “arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then,
under carefully defined circumstances.”80 According to the UN
Declaration on Friendly Relations, these circumstances include
subjecting people to “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” as
well as a parent state denying a people their “fundamental human
rights.81 Additionally, the external right may arise upon a “direct or
indirect violation of the right of internal self-determination, exhaustion
of effective judicial remedies; and realistic political arrangements for
the realization of internal self-determination.”82
In short, external self-determination is meant as a last resort. The
situation on the ground must be as dire as the denial of fundamental
human rights. Not only that, but even in the face of such oppression, the
oppressed population must exhaust every possible judicial and political
75. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282 (Can.) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68, at 9.
79. John B. Henriksen, Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous
Peoples, INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 6, 9-10 (2001).
80. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 75, at 282.
81. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 68.
82. Joshua Castellino, Book Review, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 794 (2005).
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solution to secure its right to internal self-determination within the
framework of the existing state. On their face, these requirements
express international law’s bias toward state sovereignty even at the
expense of the rights of a people. As discussed below, however, this
bias is necessary in order to maintain a stable system of international
law in which states are the principal actors.
C. Remedial Secession
Because secession is one expression of external self-determination,
the extremely limited circumstances under which peoples may invoke
that right implies that there is no universal right of peoples to secede
from a state.83 Secession is by no means illegal,84 but because it is in the
interest of a state and its sovereignty not to create precedent with
respect to the subject, international law has not yet solidified the proper
conditions under which a people may secede.85 Also, if a people had a
universal right to secede, “the ensuing mass fragmentation could
undermine peace and security . . . creat[ing] 5,000 countries.”86 This
result would be unfavorable, and more importantly, antithetical to the
main principle of international law as the basis for worldwide peace and
stability.87
One author even opines that even if secession is an option based
upon the oppressive circumstances that allows a people to invoke its
right to external self-determination,
[T]he right to secession may be unwarranted if the state stops
the discrimination and institutes legal remedies. In absence of
concrete evidence showing human rights violations, and denial
of participation in government rising to the point of calling into
question the state’s territorial integrity, alternate modes of selfdetermination compatible with territorial integrity should be
exercised. They may include enhanced local self-government
in a demographic area, or union with confirmation of territorial
88
unity.
Therefore, although “self-determination is universal, its remedial
aspect applies in limited instances.”89 Discerning which instances those
are requires applying the discussion on external self-determination,
above, to the discussion of historical precedents, below.

83. See generally Wojciech Kornacki, When Minority Groups Become “People” Under
International Law, 25 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 59 (2012).
84. See generally id. at 9.
85. See generally id. at 8.
86. See generally id. at 9.
87. International Law, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2014).
88. Kornacki, supra note 83, at 89.
89. Id. at 83.
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V. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
A concrete definition of the limited instances in which a people
may invoke its right to remedial secession requires harmonizing the
ways in which the international community has applied this right in
different circumstances. Since each circumstance is emphatically
unique, the international community has had difficulty articulating a
consistent and coherent rule upon which future secessionist movements
and their antagonists may rely upon. By comparing and contrasting the
following movements, a coherent rule should emerge.
A. Kosovo
One of the most significant secessionist movements in recent
history was Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. When the
ICJ attempted to examine the legality of this declaration, it asked
whether “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo [is] in accordance with
international law?”90 At first glance, it would appear that the ICJ was
finally going to articulate a standard defining the inner and outer
boundaries of the right to a unilateral declaration of independence. This,
unfortunately, was not the case.
Limiting the scope of its decision, the ICJ emphasized that the
answer turned not on whether “international law conferred a positive
entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence” or
“whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities
situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it.” 91 Instead, the
ICJ chose only to decide, “whether or not the applicable international
law prohibited the declaration of independence.”92 By deciding this way,
the ICJ did not officially address the extent to which international law
confers a right on a people within a state to unilaterally secede.
Of particular importance is the ICJ’s analysis of “general
international law.” The ICJ observed that state practice during the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries clearly pointed “to
the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of
declarations of independence.”93 Therefore, its final conclusion was no
more than recognition that general international law did not prohibit
declarations of independence. The ICJ did not discuss whether or not an
affirmative right to declare independence vis-à-vis a right to selfdetermination exists.
On its face, it appears that the narrowness of this decision renders
it insignificant when applied to broader contexts. This may have even

90. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Power of General Assembly to Request Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403.
91. Id. at 426.
92. Id. at 425.
93. Id. at 436.
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been the court’s intention, given that a decision either finding or
denying an affirmative right to declare independence would have
provoked far-reaching consequences.94 Nevertheless, when examined
within the context in which it arose, the decision remains instructive as
a weighty data point in the present discussion’s attempt to identify a
common trend among various secessionist movements. This assertion is
only bolstered by the fact that separatist movements around the world
have relied and continued to rely on this decision for inspiration for
their own cause.95
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia
emerged out of a “tumultuous history.” 96 Concurrently with the
“Albanianisation of Kosovo,” the Yugoslav constitution explicitly
recognized Kosovo as an autonomous province, consequently launching
a Kosovar campaign for recognition as a republic.97 This progress
towards independence, however, was short-lived; in 1989, the
vehemently nationalistic Serbian-led regime of the Yugoslav Federation
“began to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy” after vilifying the Albanians as
a people.98 Despite seeking a peaceful solution to achieve selfdetermination, the Albanians faced systematic oppression, murder,
unlawful imprisonment, torture, and mass expulsion from jobs at the
hands of the Serbian regime.99 Chaos ensued. Serbian oppression of the
Albanians escalated to bona fide “ethnic cleansing” against Albanian
civilians “under the pretext of hunting” down members of the emerging
guerilla warfare-based Kosovo Liberation Army.100 The situation was so
dire that NATO “bombed targets in Yugoslavia” in a seventy-eight day
campaign justified as “necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.”101
Immediately after Kosovo declared independence, “the USA,
France, Costa Rica, Turkey, Afghanistan, Albania and the United
94. See Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Lawfulness of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, AM.
SOC.
INT’L
L.
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
17,
2010),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/27/lawfulness-kosovos-declaration-independence
(“the Court’s opinion potentially could unsettle a stable political situation and lead to adverse
consequences.”); Richard Caplan, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 55 U.S. INST. OF
PEACE
BRIEF
1,
2
(Sept.
17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB55%20The%20ICJs%20Advisory%20Opinion%20on%20
Kosovo.pdf (“the narrowness of the Court’s response meant that the Court did not weigh in on
larger questions … [T]hat might have had some bearing on . . . other [independence] contests.”).
95. Caplan, supra note 94.
96. Daniel Fierstein, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: an Incident Analysis of
Legality, Policy, and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 419 (2008).
97. See James Summers, Kosovo: From Yugoslav Province to Disputed Independence, in
KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 5-8 (James
Summers ed., 2011).
98. Besfort Rrecaj, The Kosovo Conundrum, in KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 115-16 (James Summers ed., 2011).
99. Id. at 116.
100. Id. at 121.
101. Summers, supra note 97, at 18.
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Kingdom,” states that had formally recognized the Republic of Kosovo
“recognized it for more than what was actually declared: an independent
and fully sovereign State”—a sentiment now shared by 109 UN
Member States.102 The immediate, widespread, and continuing
recognition of the legitimacy of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence, even before the ICJ decision, strongly suggests an
emerging customary international law supported by the requisite state
practice in conjunction with opinio juris.103
The purpose of going through the details of Kosovo’s violent
history leading up to its unilateral secession is to demonstrate that
Greenland’s quest for independence is in many ways distinguishable
from that of Kosovo. First, as its history reveals, Kosovo declared
independence in an environment characterized by tumult, disharmony,
hatred, ethnic cleansing, violence, extreme discrimination, and war. The
Albanians of Kosovo were not a people whose culture was respected,
humanity was honored, or identity as a people was celebrated. On the
contrary, they were persecuted as a people. As one author puts it,
“Serbian atrocities directed exclusively at Albanians showed a clear
intention to eliminate them from Kosovo” and satisfied “the definition
of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”104 Therefore, even if the ICJ
declined to consider whether the people of Kosovo had a right to
unilaterally secede, an almost universal recognition of its independent
status allows Kosovo to be the quintessential icon of a people possessed
of the right to unilaterally secede.
Greenland’s history, in contrast, contains no analogous episodes of
ethnic cleansing, violence, or even the slightest military involvement.105

102. Rrecaj, supra note 98, at 129; Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?
KOSOVO THANKS YOU, http://www.kosovothanksyou.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
103. See Rebecca Crootof, Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law, 54
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 195, 197 (2013) (“Under the classic or ‘traditional’ theory of customary
international law, a norm attains binding status if the general and consistent practice of states
demonstrates that the norm is accepted as law by the world community. State practice provides
evidence of custom, while opinio juris—the conviction that a norm is legally binding—states the
‘attitudinal requirement.’”).
104. Besfort Rrecaj, Paper, The Right to Self-Determination and Statehood: The Case of
Kosovo, BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES 66 (2006); PREVENTING GENOCIDE, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ADVISER
ON
THE
PREVENTION
OF
GENOCIDE,
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/genocide_prevention.shtml (last accessed July 10,
2014) (defining genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, including: Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See Robert Petersen, Colonialism as Seen from a Former Colonized Area, ARCTIC
CIRCLE (Oct. 25, 1992), http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/HistoryCulture/petersen.html (explaining
that “[i]n Greenland colonial history, we have no real history of oppression by force, as known
for example in Latin America and many other places. Many of the latter examples are
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This is not to discount or reduce the significance or infamy of
Denmark’s expulsion of the Thule tribe from its home or even the
Danization imposed upon it as it integrated into the Danish realm, but
even those regrettable episodes of history pale in comparison to the
violence that colored Kosovo’s birth as an independent state. Even
when this violence and ethnic cleansing amounted to genocide, the ICJ
remained hesitant to declare an affirmative right in an oppressed people
to declare independence. This indicates that the recognition of a right to
unilaterally secede must at least arise from an environment that, by
virtue of how dire it is, necessitates the creation of a new state to
prevent further chaos, loss of life, and abuses of human rights. Without
such caution, chaos would ensue on the backs of sectarians unsatisfied
with their governments in every corner of the world trying to achieve
independence. Such a result is antithetical to both existing state
sovereignty and the overarching legal principles of international law
consisting in stability and predictability.
B. Quebec
The following question remains: must a people’s right to
unilaterally secede always arise from an environment equally
tumultuous and disastrous as that of Kosovo? In contrast to the
Albanians of Kosovo, the people of Quebec have been, throughout
recent history, unsuccessful in seeking independence from Canada. In
fact, the question even reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which
found no right to external self-determination in the people of Quebec.
Its decision essentially centered around the lack of exceptional
circumstances under which a people would be entitled to unilaterally
secede from a parent state, namely, “where a people is oppressed, as for
example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group
is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political,
economic, social and cultural development.”106
Some may dismiss the Canadian high court’s decision as merely a
self-interested declaration made by the high court of a country whose
interest stands in opposition to Quebec’s. Its decision and underlying
rationale, however, bears independent legal merit. Quebec’s quest for
independence stands in sharp contrast to Kosovo’s. Insofar as Quebec
encompasses a people with the right to self-determination, there exists
no dispute. In fact, one author described Quebec as the quintessential
“nation”—”if the term “nation” has any meaning.”107 Quebec’s
characterized as internal colonialism, but military power was never used against Greenlanders,
not even in the beginning.”) (internal citations omitted).
106. Secession of Quebec, supra note 75, at 287; see also supra Sections IV(B) and (C)
(explaining in further detail the limited circumstances under which a people’s right to external
self-determination activates).
107. Elaine Bernard, Quebec Sovereignty: Devolution the Solution, PEACE & DEMOCRACY
35, 36 (1995).
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inhabitants share a common language, culture, heritage, territorial
integrity, legal system, and political structure separate and distinct from
the rest of Canada.108 All the puzzle pieces seem to be in place: the
people of Quebec are indeed a people and self-determination is a right
that all peoples possess.
Despite the presence of a people, however, the people of Quebec
are actively and comfortably able to exercise their right to selfdetermination internally and within the framework of an existing
state.109 This stands in contrast to the Albanians of Kosovo, who were
actively denied the right to exercise self-determination internally and
within the framework of their existing state. It was only then, in this
oppressed condition, did the right to exercise external self-determination
activate in the people of Kosovo. This distinction is what is really at the
heart of striking the correct balance between the very foundation of
international law, state sovereignty, and the human right of selfdetermination.
VI. THE ABSENCE OF A RIGHT OF UNILATERAL SECESSION IN GREENLAND
The discrepancy between Kosovo’s relationship to Serbia, on the
one hand, and Quebec’s relationship to Canada, on the other, paints a
relatively perspicuous picture of the extent to which a people’s right to
internal self-determination must be denied in order to justify violating
the sovereignty of a parent state through unilateral secession. If
conceptualized as a spectrum, peoples in a situation closer to the
Kosovar Albanians are more entitled to unilateral secession than are
those in the more “comfortable” position of the Quebecoise. Having
considered the relationship of both peoples to their respective parent
states, it is not difficult to apprehend that Greenland’s relationship to
Denmark mirrors Quebec’s relationship to Canada in a much more
substantial way than Kosovo’s relationship to Serbia.
Nevertheless, from a practical standpoint, apart from the
constraints of international law, Greenland lies on the brink of
independence.110 Several factors support this assertion. First, Denmark
has already expressed its willingness to negotiate the possibility of full
independence for Greenland.111 Second, Greenland itself is already
contemplating potential relations with other states—an activity that is

108. See Canada Profile, BBC NEWS: US & CANADA, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-16841111 (last updated Apr. 23, 2014).
109. See Bernard, supra note 107, at 36 (although Bernard argues that Quebec’s identity as a
nation entitles it to secede, ironically, it is this peaceful existence as the “quintessential nation”
that forecloses any possibility of unilateral secession).
110. David A. Gabel, Mineral Rush in Greenland; Independence May be Around the Corner,
ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS
NETWORK
(July
27,
2012),
http://www.enn.com/enn_original_news/article/44723.
111. Self-Government Act no. 473, supra note 5.
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part and parcel of being an independent, sovereign state.112 Furthermore,
Greenland’s premier has declared unequivocally, that, “Greenland will
be ‘one of three independent states’ in the North Atlantic.”113 This is not
an outlandish remark, given that Greenland’s independence is now
dependent almost entirely on achieving financial autonomy. 114 Evidence
suggests that it will not have a difficult time achieving such autonomy
because countries such as the United States are “highly interested in
investing in the resource base of the country and in tapping the vast
expected hydrocarbons off the Greenlandic coast.”115
Do these factors, though, somehow entitle the Greenlandic people
to unilaterally secede without Denmark’s consent? No—mere
practicality does not translate to “legal right.” The fact remains that
Greenland’s nearness to achieving independence comes only at the
pleasure of Denmark, its sovereign. As indicated above, Quebec can
potentially function as its own state, practically speaking; yet it has no
legal right to unilaterally secede from Canada because the right of its
people to exist as itself has not been denied. Thus, after comparing
Greenland’s position to that of Kosovo and Quebec, it is clear that the
systematic denial of its people’s right to internal self-determination
required to activate its right to external self-determination and justify
violating Denmark’s inviolable sovereignty is simply not present.
Nevertheless, several arguments exist in favor of Greenland having
a right to unilaterally declare independence. The most convincing of
these arguments is the proposition that Greenland, a former colony of
Denmark, has not yet exercised, or is not permitted to exercise at all, its

112. See Xinhua News, Greenland warm to China’s involvement in Arctic, COPENHAGEN
POST (Nov. 5, 2011), http://cphpost.dk/news/greenland-warm-to-chinas-involvement-inarctic.70.html; see also Spotlight on the Arctic at Brussel´s Cine-ONU, UNRIC (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/28146-spotlight-on-the-arctic-at-brusselas-cine-onu
(indicating that “Greenland´s Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist has met such luminaries as the
President of South-Korea, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and EU Commission
President José Manuel Barroso. Last, but not least, the Arctic and Greenland are understood to
have been high on the agenda in the state visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Denmark in
2012.”).
113. Greenland’s premier presents vision for 2050, NUNATSIAQ ONLINE (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674greenlands_premier_presents_his_vision_for_
greenland_in_2050/; see also Kuupik Kleist, Speech at the Seminar on Greenland and the Arctic,
Greenland’s approach to EU’s Arctic Communication, GREENLAND REPRESENTATION TO THE
EU,
BRUSSELS
(Oct.
29,
2009),
available
at
http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/EuGl/~/media/CF10597313C04F94920CD8ACE17EDEB3.ashx (where
Greenland’s premier boasts “we … have a landmass which can almost cover the entire European
continent and a location which is now increasingly becoming a geostrategic centre of the world’s
attention. If Europe is ready to listen to our concerns Greenland could become your Arctic
window.”).
114. Kathrin Keil, U.S. Interests in Greenland – On a Path Towards Full Independence?,
THE ARCTIC INST. CTR. FOR CIRCUMPOLAR SEC. STUD. (June 21, 2011), available at
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/08/us-interest-will-us-help-greenland-to.html.
115. Id.
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right to external self-determination.116 Understanding this argument
requires a little bit of background. In the context of colonized peoples,
the UN defines “self-determination” as the right of a colonized people
or a dependent territory to “decide about the future status of [its]
homeland.”117 After the UN recognized self-determination as a human
right, some formerly colonized territories exercised that right by
becoming independent while others “chose free association, or
integration with an independent State.”118 The process by which these
territories exercised their right to self-determination is known as
decolonization.”119
Currently, Greenland is neither a colony nor a non-self-governing
territory. On June 5, 1953, Greenland was fully integrated into the
Danish realm.120 An amendment to the Danish constitution made
Greenland “a province represented by two members in Parliament.” 121
In this way, the people of Greenland “acquired the same rights and
duties as other Danish citizens.”122 Greenland has therefore already
undergone the process of decolonization.
The question, though, is whether, through the process of
decolonization, Greenland actually exercised its right to selfdetermination. Answering this question is both central and
determinative for the following reasons. If the people of Greenland have
indeed exercised, and are exercising their right to self-determination
through the process of decolonization and in its current mode of
existence, then independence from Denmark is no longer an option
outside of Denmark’s free consent or in the face of a denial of internal
self-determination and human rights abuses by the sovereign. If, on the
other hand, the people of Greenland have not yet exercised their right to
self-determination in spite of the process of decolonization, then the
people of Greenland have an absolute right to choose for themselves
whether they want to secede from Denmark and become a sovereign
state.
One scholar contends that the people of Greenland did not exercise
their right to self-determination when Greenland was integrated as a
part of Denmark in 1953 and therefore remains entitled to unilaterally
secede pursuant to their former colonial status.123 In support of his
116. Gudmundur S. Alfredsson, Greenland and the Right to Self-Determination, 51 NORDISK
TIDSSKRIFT INT’L RET 39 (1982).
117. Questions
and
Answers
on Decolonization,
THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/questions_answers.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2012); see also
Questions and Answers on Decolonization, SELF DETERMINATION INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN
AFRICA, http://sedisa.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/questions-and-answers-on-decolonization/ (last
visited Aug. 6, 2014).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Alfredsson, supra note 116, at 39.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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assertion, six factors are cited, five of which are particularly relevant to
the present discussion. First, he claims that Greenlanders did not have
an opportunity to make a real choice as to their fate; they only had the
choice between the status quo or integration.124 Second, he contends that
the Greenlandic Provincial Council neither possessed sufficient time nor
was given access to competent expertise before approving the proposal
for integration created by an all-Danish Constitutional Commission.125
Third, the author doubts the effectiveness of the Danish-created
Provincial Council and maintains that it was not competent to take on
the “immense task of deciding permanently on the constitutional future
of Greenland” because the Danish government gave it only minimal
power.126 Fourth, the author indicates that the people of Greenland did
not participate in a referendum about whether to integrate or to seek
independence.127 Lastly, the author indicates that East and North
Greenland had no representatives.128
Furthermore, the same argument identifies eight aspects in which
Greenland is so distinct from Denmark as to constitute a separate
political entity: geographically, ethnically, culturally, historically,
judicially, politically, administratively, and economically. 129 He argues
that the existence of these factors makes it so that Greenland remains a
colony still entitled to exercise the right to external selfdetermination.130 This argument depends primarily on General
Assembly Resolution 1541(XV), which provides guidelines that help
determine whether or not a former colony has been decolonized through
integration with its parent state, self-governance, or other permissible
mechanism.131
The author, however, misapplies and mischaracterizes Resolution
1541 in a few critical ways. First, the aforementioned eight aspects do
not necessitate or imply that the Greenlandic people are entitled to
external self-determination. Rather, they are merely factors that may
require the sovereign to transmit information to the UN regarding the
progress of decolonization. This is only true where those factors place
the territory in a position of subordination. To this effect, Principle V of
Resolution 1541 characterizes a territory as a colony only where the
elements “affect the relationship between the metropolitan State and the
territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a

124. Id. at 40-41.
125. Id. at 40.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 41.
129. Id at 42-43.
130. Id. at 43.
131. G.A. Res. 1541(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960), available at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/153/15/IMG/NR015315.pdf?OpenElement.
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position or status of subordination.”132
Moreover, the extent to which Greenland retains a unique
character within the framework of another independent state does not
mean that it is repressed in its attempt to exercise self-determination—
quite the contrary; this actually demonstrates that Denmark is doing
what it should be doing—respecting the Greenlandic people’s right to
internal self-determination. Greenland is only “subordinate” insofar as it
exists within the framework of another sovereign state. This is not the
sort of arbitrary subordination contemplated by Resolution 1541. In
fact, several factors all point to Greenland’s status as an equal partner
with Denmark and not a subordinate: (1) the Self-Government Act
agreed upon by Greenland and Denmark; (2) its affirmance of
Greenlandic as the official language; (3) its broad grant of power to
Greenlandic authorities; (4) the supermajority of native Inuit; and, most
powerfully, (5) Greenland’s participation in international dialogue
concerning its own natural resources and the fact that it has already
concluded agreements133 with other states. Thus, even if Greenland was
once in a position of subordination—for instance, during the period of
“Danization” or the forced relocation of the Thule tribe—Denmark has
taken steps to remedy all, if any, denials of self-determination. Under
these circumstances, in addition to the fact that Greenland’s relationship
to Denmark is nowhere near that of Kosovo to Serbia, the Greenlandic
people do not have a right to unilateral, remedial secession.
VI. INTERNATIONAL POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT A RIGHT TO
UNILATERAL SECESSION IN GREENLAND
Limiting the right of the people of Greenland to unilaterally secede
from Denmark by the standards outlined above produces a curious and
ironic result. The Greenlandic Inuit, no matter how linguistically and
culturally distinct from the Danish, have no right to legally actualize
their uniqueness through unilateral secession unless they somehow
suffer under the hypothetical heavy hand of Denmark. Moreover,
recognizing that Greenland does not have a right to unilateral secession
is necessary to maintain international law’s preoccupation with stability
and predictability. Understanding why requires weighing the right to
self-determination against the concept of state sovereignty—the
backbone of international law.
Within each of a number of different sovereign states throughout
the world, there exist multiple separatist movements, each asserting its

132. Id.
133. See Agreement between the Government of Greenland and the Government of the
Republic of Guatemala Concerning the Exchange of Information Relating to Tax Matters,
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/50353568.pdf [hereinafter The
Agreement].

SAID_FINAL_FOR_PUB

10/14/2014 2:21 PM

2014] Birth Pangs: Greenland’s Struggle for Independence

303

right as a people to self-determination.134 Intuitively speaking, chaos
would ensue if Greenland had a right to unilaterally declare
independence. Consider the following: if a right to unilateral secession
existed in the Greenlandic people, the threshold would be at its lowest
ebb. It would thus be relatively easy for any separatist movement that is
politically, socially, religiously, and culturally distinct from the
sovereign state in which it exists to “violate” the sovereignty of that
state. That result, especially given the number of separatist movements
currently in existence, would destroy the meaning and value of
sovereignty and reduce it to a mere nullity.
Additionally, it is impractical, at least at this point in time, for
Greenland, in its current position of total and complete economic
dependence on Denmark, to seek total independence instead of
continuing to pursue self-determination within the framework of the
Realm. Despite all of the potential wealth with which Greenland may be
privy to from its vast mineral deposits and natural resources,
independence by any mode is still only a mere potentiality. Moreover,
the chairman of the Commission on Self-Government himself opined
that
“[a] country like Greenland, with its geographical location and
with such a small population base, will always be dependent
on other countries . . . . I believe that Greenland can preserve
its greatest possible relative independence as long as the
country is in a community of
the realm with a small, militarily
weak nation like Denmark.”135
In other words, existing within the framework of Denmark may
actually afford the Greenlandic people a greater opportunity to exercise
self-determination than would the economic sacrifice that independence
would demand.136
VII. CONCLUSION
Having scrutinized, through the prism of international law, the
possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by the people of
Greenland, it is apparent that an international tribunal’s support of a
right to unilateral secession in Greenland is both unlikely and would be
imprudent. It is unlikely because the relationship between the people of
Greenland and the sovereign Denmark is not marred by the degree of
human rights violations or even a denial of internal self-determination

134. See Separatist Movements: Should Nations Have a Right to Self-Determination? 2 CQ
GLOBAL
RESEARCHER
86,
88-90
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cqpress.com/docs/AffiliationsPDFs/separatists.pdf (last accessed July 10, 2014).
135. Jens Dahl, Self-Government in Greenland, INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 36, 39 (2001).
136. Independence: A Huge Task, but Not Hopeless, THE NIRAS REPORT, 8 (Oct. 19, 2012),
available
at
http://www.ga.gl/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=BvkaP0u0API%3d&tabid=1264&language=da
[hereinafter Independence].
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that approaches the severity of the historical cases wherein unilateral
secession has come to fruition. It is imprudent because doing so would
threaten the very foundation of global stability. One need only imagine
a situation where any group of people existing within the framework of
an existing state could unilaterally declare itself an independent state
capable of having relations with other states. The result would pervert
any meaningful concept of statehood. Because states are the principal
actors in the international arena, their individual sovereignty must be
affirmed and protected by the boundaries that international law draws
around the concept of external self-determination.
This does not mean that Greenland has been dealt an underhanded
blow. By remaining a constituent part of the kingdom of Denmark, the
people of Greenland do not thereby forego or abandon their right to
exercise self-determination. The result is quite the opposite. The new
self-government framework actually “extends Greenland’s possibilities
for greater self-determination.”137 And while it is limited and entirely
dependent upon Greenland’s economic growth, it makes possible a
greater actualization of Greenlandic identity in a cooperative, rather
than an antagonistic, relationship with the Danish government. And in
light of the fact that Greenland is likely to achieve economic
independence,138 it seems much more prudent for its people to work
with Denmark at arms length, retaining the latter as a strategic
economic partner, rather than by attempting to tear away at the
foundation of international stability—state sovereignty.

137. Graugaard, supra note 37, at 49.
138. See id.

